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Abstract
Th e debate on the relationship between the Rule of the Community (S) and the 
Damascus Document (D) can be distorted by concentrating on the diff erences 
between the documents, without a clear appreciation of the signifi cance of their 
mutual correspondences. Th e concept of idem identity is here adopted to demon-
strate that what the movement was considered to be is at least as important to ask 
as who its members were considered (and considered themselves) to be (questions 
of their ipse identity). Th e movement could be perceived to be the same, persisting 
overtime, despite various kinds of diff erences. Th e article seeks to identify critical 
elements of diversity allowed within the same movement. An experiment on the  
idem identity is provided by looking at the rule documents and the admission in 
particular. In its shared social identity, the movement seems to depict itself rather 
in terms of its activities such as counsel and qualifi cations than particular forms of 
communities and organizations.
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Identity is an elusive concept. Th is paper off ers conceptual tools for talking 
about identity and defi ning which aspects of identity are relevant in 
 diff erent investigations, using both philosophical concepts and insights 
from the social identity approach. More specifi cally, the paper will discuss 
the idem identity of the Qumran movement:1 the question of how the 
1 Th e “Qumran movement” is, in my view, a practical term to designate the 
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members in this particular sectarian movement might have perceived the 
conditions for sameness over time.
Concepts, Th eoretical Frameworks and the Task
According to one conceptual analysis of “identity,” a distinction can be 
made between idem identity (identity as sameness), and ipse identity (iden-
tity as selfhood ).2 Idem identity refers to those conditions which determine 
that an entity is the same at time t1 as at time t2.3 Th is sameness can be 
investigated concerning any entity, not just human beings. Usually, some 
change is allowed over time and yet sameness is preserved. We do not 
question the sameness of a pencil or a sunset now and fi ve minutes ago, 
even though there could be diff erences in them now and then. It is a 
matter of what an entity is understood to be. If a human being is under-
stood to be a biological creature, for example, s/he is the same human 
being even though s/he changes, grows up, or loses mental ability, e.g., 
consciousness.
Th is meaning of identity is useful when scholars investigate the changes 
that took place in the Qumran movement. Th e question of whether we 
can speak of the same movement is raised in comparisons of the Damascus 
Document (D) and the Rule of the Community (S) communities especially: 
how much variation is allowed in order to be able to speak of the same 
movement? What this movement is understood to be defi nes the answer. 
Th e question of whether the Qumran movement can be considered the 
social movement whose members stood in tension with societal change and (at 
least some of them) were responsible for copying, preserving and composing the 
Dead Sea Scrolls, irrespective of where these members lived. Th e “Qumran com-
munity” refers to people at Qumran. Designations based on emic terminology are 
problematic, since those terms can be shared by only part of the members. Th e 
“Essenes” has a controversial tone. We need an etic title. “Qumran” could perhaps 
be replaced by “Dead Sea Scrolls” but this could be misunderstood to refer to a 
literary level. 
2 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: Th e University of Chicago Press, 
1992). I wish to thank Arto Laitinen, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium 
for Advanced Studies, for bringing this distinction to my attention. 
3 For this philosophical question, see Richard Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern 
Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death (Chicago: Th e University of Chicago 
Press, 2006), 94–111.
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same as the Essenes of the Classical Sources also has to do with sameness. 
In this case, two entities exist: we know they are not one entity, but we may 
ask to what extent they are identical.4 Th us, speaking about the “identity 
of the Qumran community/ies” can mean scholarly identifi cations of these 
groupings with one or none of the other Second Temple Jewish groups 
(etic point of view). Whether or not we perceive the communities as being 
the same is, of course, relevant for many research questions, including the 
right to use one set of sources to illuminate another set of sources. How-
ever, the object of the inquiry is historical, and the Dead Sea Scrolls pro-
vide us partial historical evidence from the ancient people themselves (emic 
point of view).
Ipse identity, on the other hand, is one’s selfhood, created by interpreta-
tive processes in which an individual refl ects on the question “Who am I?” 
and lives accordingly.5 Th is identity is not constituted by facts about the 
self or by others’ perceptions of the self, but by the individual’s experiences 
and interpretations of self. Th e self exists in these interpretations; it is not 
something separate from them.6 To illustrate the distinction between idem 
identity and ipse identity, we may think of a person who, tragically, tells 
his/her partner, “I am not the person you fell in love with.” Th is claim is 
false in the sense of the idem identity (it is the same person—hence the 
4 Th is is qualitative sameness/identity: two television sets can be identical but 
they are not one entity. See Arto Laitinen, Strong Evaluation Without Sources: On 
Charles Taylor’s Philosophical Anthropology and Cultural Moral Realism ( Jyväskylä 
Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 224; Jyväskylä: University 
of Jyväskylä, 2003), 116.
5 Ipse identity is something that belongs to self-refl ective animals only, see 
Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 45. Studies in philosophy have often centered 
on the question of what has changed in the perception of the self from antiquity 
and the middle ages to modern times. Humans, including infants, have the need 
tosee the world in relation to themselves. Persons might not have a strong sense of 
self but they still view the world in terms of self (or, in some cases, in terms of 
many selves), see Sorabji, Self, 23. For the discussion of the anachronistic but 
continued relevance of the concept “identity” in antiquity, see Judith M. Lieu, 
Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2004).
6 However, a person/subject/human being can be seen to exist independently 
of the self, see Laitinen, Strong Evaluation Without Sources, 8. According to Sorabji, 
(Self, 21), a person has or owns psychological states and actions.
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tragedy), and true in the sense of the ipse identity (what kind of person one 
sees oneself to be).7 Idem identity is about what constitutes the same 
person(s)/things at diff erent times, and ipse identity is about what diff eren-
tiates people at the same time.8
I have previously used the concept “social identity” and insights from 
the social identity approach—a social psychological approach—in discus-
sion about identity.9 How do ipse and idem identities relate to this approach 
and why are all of these concepts necessary in order to speak of the ancient 
phenomena?
Th e social identity approach reminds us about the social-psychological 
processes and fl uidity relevant to understanding the ipse and idem identi-
ties. Th e approach claims that the essential parts of the ipse identity 
(although that concept is not used in the approach) are constructed in a 
social process. A theoretical distinction is made between one’s personal 
identity and one’s social identity. Personal identity is one’s perception of 
oneself as a distinct individual.10 “Social identity” is a conceptual tool, 
 7 Th is example is from a discussion with Arto Laitinen.
 8 Sorabji, Self, 2.
 9 Jutta Jokiranta, “Identity on a Continuum: Constructing and Expressing 
Sectarian Social Identity in Qumran Serakhim and Pesharim” (Ph.D. diss., 
Helsinki University, 2005), which includes the articles: “Th e Prototypical Teacher 
in the Qumran Pesharim: A Social Identity Approach,” in Ancient Israel: Th e Old 
Testament in Its Social Context (ed. Philip F. Esler; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2006), 254–63; “Social Identity Approach: Identity-Constructing Elements in 
the Psalms Pesher,” in Defi ning Identities: We, You, and the Other in the Dead Sea 
Scrolls: Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting of the IOQS in Groningen (ed. Florentino 
García Martínez and Mladen Popović; STDJ 70; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 85–109. 
Literature on the social identity approach is vast. For the introduction to the 
approach, see Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, eds., Social Identity Th eory: 
Constructive and Critical Advances (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990); 
W. Peter Robinson, ed., Social Groups and Identities: Developing the Legacy of 
Henri Tajfel (International Series in Social Psychology; Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann, 1996). 
10 According to one philosophical conceptualization, “individual identity” 
includes, for example, biographical identity (one’s narrative of life events and 
experiences that are considered important for forming the self); practical identity 
(one’s commitment to certain values and goals in life); qualitative identity 
( personal characteristics that one feels important in a given situation); numerical 
identity (one’s sense of one’s singularity). See Laitinen, Strong Evaluation Without 
Sources, 118. My claim is that social identities can play a part in one’s ipse identity 
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limited to describing “that part of an individual’s self concept which 
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together 
with the value and emotional signifi cance attached to that membership.”11 
A person’s self-conception refl ects self-categorization, “the cognitive 
grouping of the self as identical to some class of stimuli in contrast to some 
other class of stimuli.”12 Th is includes accentuation of in-group similarities 
and exaggeration of diff erences from out-groups. Th e comparative nature of 
social identity makes it relative in terms of various situations; variant social 
identities can be salient at diff erent times and places, and social identities 
form hierarchies.13 Social categories are never fi xed but dynamic and 
 fl exible.
in  various ways: as part of the biographical identity (group memberships consti-
tute important stages in the individual’s life), as part of the practical identity 
(a signifi cant goal is tied to a group membership), and as part of the qualitative 
identity (the individual categorizes him/herself in terms of group characteristic in 
a given situation), even as part of one’s numerical identity (the individual sees 
him/herself as the same person since s/he continues to belong to the same social 
entities). However, Laitinen (Strong Evaluation Without Sources, 128) relates most 
social identities only to qualitative identity. Combining these theoretical perspec-
tives, I would say that, in the sense that social identity is an individual’s perception 
of him/herself, social identity is a narrower concept than the ipse identity; the ipse 
identity can take the form of a social identity.
11 Henri Tajfel, Diff erentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psy-
chology of Intergroup Relations (London: Academic Press, 1978), 63. It thus 
includes three dimensions: identifi cation, value judgment and emotional attach-
ment. Group memberships can in theory be anything; they are based on features 
regulated by the group itself. Some given features (e.g., skin color) often consti-
tute group memberships and some given features not (e.g., length of hair—
although this can also constitute a group).
12 John C. Turner, “Some Current Issues in Research on Social Identity and 
Self-Categorization Th eories,” in Social Identity: Context, Commitment, Content 
(ed. Naomi Ellemers, Russel Spears, and Bertjan Doosje; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999), 6–34 (12).
13 Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifi cations: A Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (London: Routledge, 1988); 
Michael A. Hogg and Craig McGarty, “Self-Categorization and Social Identity,” 
in Abrams and Hogg, eds., Social Identity Th eory: Constructive and Critical 
Advances, 10–27; S. Alexander Haslam, Psychology in Organizations: Th e Social 
Identity Approach (2nd ed.; London: SAGE, 2004). Th e salience of a category 
depends on its relevance to the situation: a comparative fi t determines the level at 
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It makes a great diff erence whether we think of identity as something 
given or something constructed.14 Th e distinction between idem identity 
and ipse identity can serve here as well: idem identity is something that 
precedes our interpretations and is thus, in a way, given.15 We perceive 
ourselves to be the same today as yesterday, and twenty years earlier, even 
though many things have changed in the kind of persons we perceive our-
selves to be. Ipse identity, on the other hand, is created through interpreta-
tions in various situations and it is thus constituted. To claim that ipse 
identity is “constructed” can imply a conscious, refl ective, and active pro-
cess, which is not always the case. Many parts of identity can be  unconscious, 
and individuals are not “free” to choose whatever aspects they wish to 
include in their identity. Social identities can be seen as given in the sense 
that people in any society internalize social categorizations that are around 
them.16 Yet, they are always situational and dynamic, sort of “social con-
textual defi nitions of the individual.”17
Th e Dead Sea Scrolls are full of metaphors that can be taken as identity 
markers. But not all such metaphorical identities were operative at the 
same time. Some were evidently more primary than others, some were on 
a higher level of abstraction than others, and some probably varied from 
group to group or from time to time. Social identity is more than catego-
rization: it includes identifi cation, the emotional and valuative signifi cance 
of that group membership for the person. Not all group members have the 
same degree of identifi cation and apply the same meaning to this identifi -
which diff erences from other in-group members are perceived to be smaller than 
 diff erences from relevant out-group members. Furthermore, a normative fi t refers 
to a person’s previous experiences and knowledge, which aff ect the categorization 
process in determining what diff erences are perceived to be relevant. Th e accen-
tuation eff ect, the perception of in-group members as homogeneous and respec-
tively diff erent from out-group members, is more pronounced when the category 
is important and of immediate relevance to the individual.
14 Th e distinction is noted by Carol A. Newsom, Th e Self as Symbolic Space: 
Constructing Identity and Community at Qumran (STDJ 52; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 
192.
15 Cf. Laitinen, Strong Evaluation Without Sources, 130.
16 John C. Turner, “Henri Tajfel: An Introduction,” in Robinson, ed., Social 
Groups and Identities, 1–23 (17).
17 John C. Turner and Richard Y. Bourhis, “Social Identity, Interdependence 
and the Social Group: A Reply to Rabbie et al.,” in Robinson, ed., Social Groups 
and Identities, 25–63 (32).
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cation: to be European does not mean the same to every person who 
 categorizes him/herself as a European.18 What, then, is the justifi cation for 
speaking of a shared social identity? Is this an average of all the individual 
social identities or something else? Do groups have a collective identity?
Social identity theorists maintain that “the social nature of identities 
implies that there is a socially based construction of meaning as well, 
 leading people to show consensus in at least some aspects of the identity 
defi nition.”19 Social identity involves an ongoing and dynamic process by 
which the individuals “show consensus” and adopt shared meanings. 
 Naturally, contentious and deviating stances may also occur. Th erefore, 
any metaphorical representation of the social identity in the Scrolls, such 
as the “new covenant in the land of Damascus” (CD 19: 33–34), “yaḥad,” 
“the most holy dwelling” (1QS 8:8), “covenant” (1QS 1:16; CD 2:2); 
“volunteers” (1QS 1:11); “congregation of Israel” (1QSa 1:1); “children 
of light” (1QM 1:1); “congregation of the poor” (4QpPsa 2:10) are not to 
be treated as frozen and fi xed, isolated from their textual worlds and 
directly transferred to the social world of the movement. It is probable that 
these labels and categories formed a network in the members’ identities 
where some were more central than others, some perhaps not operative 
at all, and that categories formed hierarchical levels. For example, “Israel” 
is a high level category, but can, on the other hand, function as a lower 
level (restricted) category.20 “Israel” in D is not always at the same level 
of abstraction as is “yaḥad” in S. If a member identifi ed him/herself as 
a member of the “yaḥad,” it is possible that in comparison to non-
Jews, s/he still categorized him/herself as an “Israelite.” Or consider the 
“camp”  language in D. Whether or not it was at all an identity category 
(“camp- member”), or a theological statement on biblical wilderness ideas 
18 Kay Deaux (“Models, Meanings and Motivations,” in Social Identity Processes: 
Trends in Th eory and Research [ed. Dora Capozza and Rupert Brown; London: 
SAGE, 2000], 1–14 (6)) refers to a study in which great variation was found con-
cerning the contents of Hispanic identity among Hispanic students. Attempts have 
been made to analyze the dimensions of diff erence within a social identity category, 
e.g., cognitive, evaluative and behavioral dimensions of social identifi cation.
19 Deaux, “Models, Meanings and Motivations,” 6.
20 Cf. John J. Collins, “Th e Construction of Israel in the Sectarian Rule Books,” 
in Judaism in Late Antiquity, Part 5: Th e Judaisms of Qumran: A Systemic reading 
of the Dead Sea Scrolls, Vol. 1: Th eory of Israel (ed. Alan J. Avery-Peck, Jacob 
Neusner, and Bruce Chilton; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 25–42. 
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(“wilderness-member—exiled but blessed”)21 is an important question 
to ask.22
Now the research question can be formulated more clearly: to what 
extent is it likely that the available social identities of the members of the 
Qumran movement at one time were the same as at another time? In other 
words, if they perceived “us” in one way at time t1, which diff erences were 
allowed in the defi nition of “us” at time t2 for the movement to be the 
same? Th e question thus investigates the sameness of the ipse identity (in 
this case, its social aspect) and the answer partly defi nes the grounds on 
which we can speak of the idem identity of the Qumran movement, its 
sameness over time.
Experimenting on Rule Documents
Th is article limits the inquiry to D and S. Th e relationship between D and 
S and other rulebooks (e.g., 1QSa; 4Q265) as well as the development 
within these manuscript traditions have been a continuous interest among 
scholars.23 Recently, Hilary Kapfer presented a survey of some of the views 
in favor of the chronological primacy of either D or S; she herself defends 
the primacy of D on the basis of the attitudes towards the Temple.24 Th e 
community of D is commonly seen either as a parent movement of the S 
21 See Liv Lied, “Another Look at the Land of Damascus: Th e Spaces of the 
Damascus Document in the Light of Edward W. Soja’s Th irdspace Approach,” in 
New Directions in Qumran Studies: Proceedings of the Bristol Colloquium on the 
Dead Sea Scrolls, 8–10 September (ed. Jonathan G. Campbell, William John 
Lyons, and Lloyd K. Pietersen; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 101– 25.
22 If the former, it stands in distinction to “city-members:” sex was prohibited 
in the holy city (CD 12:1–2; also 12:19–20), but family life was carried out in the 
camps (CD 7:6b–9a // 19:1–5a). Th e Cave 4 fragments of D mention together 
“all who dwell in their [c]amps and all who d[well in] their [cities]” (4QDe 7 ii 14; 
reconstructed also in 4QDa 11 20 // 4QDd 16 18).
23 For literature, see Charlotte Hempel, Th e Damascus Texts (Companion to 
the Qumran Scrolls 1; Sheffi  eld: Sheffi  eld Academic Press, 2000), and Sarianna 
Metso, Th e Serekh Texts (Companion to the Qumran Scrolls 9; London: T&T 
Clark, 2007).
24 Hilary Evans Kapfer, “Th e Relationship between the Damascus Document 
and the Community Rule: Attitudes towards the Temple as a Test Case,” DSD 14 
(2007): 152–77.
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community, or a larger movement of which the S community is a part. 
However, the idea that D is later than S has also found support, as Kapfer 
shows, and most recently, Eyal Regev postulates the “D sect” as a later and 
more hierarchical development of S, yet independent of it.25 Th e question 
of the relationship between these documents is also dependent on how 
scholars reconstruct the textual histories within S and D traditions. No 
consensus exists here either: the chronological order of individual manu-
scripts within one tradition, the S tradition in particular, has not been 
established.26 In contrast to those scholars who regard the shorter 4QSb,d 
manuscripts as early representatives of the S tradition despite the late age 
of these copies,27 others see them as shortened versions of the longer and 
more original S tradition such as 1QS.28 Th ese questions have direct rele-
vance to the understanding of the movement, its make-up, authority 
structures and ideology, and sociological assumptions play a role in the 
conclusions one makes.
25 Kapfer, “Th e Relationship,” 157–61; Eyal Regev, Sectarianism in Qumran: 
A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Religion and Society 45; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007). 
26 Th e D tradition has much less variation than the S tradition. Most exten-
sively, the variations between the CD A and CD B manuscripts and their relation-
ship have been debated; see, Hempel, Damascus Texts, 77–79. 
27 E.g., Sarianna Metso, Th e Textual Development of the Qumran Community 
Rule (STDJ 21; Leiden: Brill, 1997); Charlotte Hempel, “Th e Literary Develop-
ment of the S Tradition—a New Paradigm,” RevQ 22/87 (2007): 389–401 (391). 
According to this view, the shorter versions testify to early stages in the redactional 
process that lack complete sections of 1QS (e.g., columns 1–4 of 1QS), biblical 
quotations (e.g., Isa 40:3 of 1QS 8:14), more elaborate phrases (e.g., on the “peo-
ple of injustice” in 1QS 5:11–13), and references to the “sons of Zadok” (e.g., in 
comparison to 1QS 5:2), etc. 
28 E.g., P. S. Alexander, “Th e Redaction-History of Serekh ha-Yaḥad: A Pro-
posal,” RevQ 17/65–68 (1996): 437–56. Recently, Devorah Dimant (“Th e Com-
posite Character of the Qumran Sectarian Literature as an Indication of Its Date 
and Provenance,” RevQ 22/88 [2006]: 615–30) argues that 1QS is a primary, 
early and even an offi  cial exemplar of the S tradition on the basis of its early 
manuscript dating, its physical features as a carefully produced, large scroll, and 
the fact that it has been corrected which shows that it had an important status. 
Dimant thinks that the shorter recensions were abbreviated from a longer version, 
“perhaps  copied for private use” (619).
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I am interested in seeking to explore alternative—or complementary—
methodological ways of proceeding, in comparison with those who have 
investigated the “Judaisms” of D and S,29 and with those who quickly 
translate the perceived diff erences between D and S into “communities,” 
often a “parent” and a “child” one, but also with those who read the docu-
ments synchronically at a literary level. I shall speak heuristically of “D 
members” and “S members” as hypothetical constructs of the implied 
users of the respective documents and the kinds of persons they con-
structed, although the functions of the documents are not clear—they may 
not have constituted a community in the fi rst place—and, in reality, there 
could have existed an “X-type of membership” with features from both or 
neither of them (and, in theory, a myriad of memberships). Th is is a heu-
ristic enterprise. Th e thought-experiment is intentionally biased towards 
fi nding a basis for perceptions of togetherness, sameness and continuity, in 
spite of diff erences, distinctions and discontinuity. Members that share the 
same identity could easily fi nd elements that diff erentiate between them; 
sameness is created in distinction to something on the outside and needs 
constant maintenance.
Idem Identity within the S Tradition
To discuss anything about the identities of the members, we have to start 
with the manuscript evidence. Whatever direction one takes concerning 
the development of the S tradition, it is to be noted that the shorter ver-
sions of S are not simply building blocks of or extracts from the longer 
versions. Recently, Charlotte Hempel stressed that, concerning the termi-
nology of the community (especially rabbîm and the “council of the com-
munity”), some of the shorter traditions (4QSd) testify to diversity within 
themselves. Th is suggests that some independent traditions were already 
brought together in these shorter versions or their predecessors.30 Hempel 
29 Philip R. Davies, “Th e Judaism(s) of the Damascus Document,” in Th e 
Damascus Document: A Centennial of Discovery: Proceedings of the Th ird Interna-
tional Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and 
Associated Literature, 4–8 February, 1998 (ed. Joseph M. Baumgarten, Esther G. 
Chazon, and Avital Pinnick; STDJ 34; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 27–43.
30 Hempel, “Th e Literary Development,” 389–401. According to her, “[t]he 
developments are not confi ned to the boundaries of any of the preserved manu-
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sees continuity between various manuscripts in the traditions about “peo-
ple of injustice,” “sons of Aaron” and the “council of the community.” It 
is more likely that these traditions stem from an early, common stratum 
rather than indicate a later redaction in various manuscripts.31 Devorah 
Dimant, who considers the manuscript datings to be suffi  cient evidence 
for the primacy of 1QS over against 4QSb,d and takes the shorter versions 
as abbreviations of the longer, does not explain, however, why such abbre-
viations diff ered from the wordings of 1QS, why they preserved the variety 
rather than harmonized it, and why they might have dropped out certain 
data.32 If the hypothesis of the primacy of 1QS is to be supported, these 
aspects call for further explanations. Dimant admits that 1QS is a compi-
lation and relies on earlier sources.33 If there were sources behind 1QS, 
these would, in my mind, be something very similar to what we fi nd in 
4QS manuscripts that preserve shorter sections—and thus, in any case, a 
setting where such shorter traditions were fi rst created would have to be 
postulated. Dimant would place such a setting in a very early period, before 
the emergence of the “Qumran community,”34 and Hempel speaks of 
scripts” (393). Th e independence of the rabbîm and “council” language is sug-
gested by the fact that some sections contain only one type of language but not the 
other, as Hempel states: “Th e presence of such passages that attest exclusively one 
set of terms indicates that the confl ation is probably secondary” (398). Th ese per-
spectives could also be used to oppose the view by John J. Collins (“Forms of 
Community in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Emanuel: Studies in Hebrew Bible, 
Septuagint, and Dead Sea Scrolls in Honor of Emanuel Tov [ed. Shalom M. Paul
et al.; VTSup 94; Leiden: Brill, 2003], 97–111) of the “elite group” within yaḥad: 
section 1QS 8–9 does use again slightly diff erent language (perfection and holi-
ness) but this does not have to indicate the existence of an elite group but rather 
the elevation of a certain type of social identity, based on confl ation of traditions.
31 Hempel, “Th e Literary Development,” 395–96.
32 Dimant, “Th e Composite Character,” 619–20. Th e personal use of a scroll 
would not exclude the possibility that it would preserve earlier, shorter traditions. 
It could well be conceivable that if the need to have handy portable versions arose, 
they could also use the earlier shorter traditions for this purpose.
33 Dimant, “Th e Composite Character,” 621, stresses that “the existence of 
distinct sections, or even underlying sources, is not necessarily at odds with a 
single overall framework [of 1QS].”
34 Dimant, “Th e Composite Character,” 622, writes that the sources “must 
date to the second half of the second century B.C.E. at the latest. Yet even at this 
early point these sources are already elaborate and use an evolved terminology.”
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“primitive small scale contexts” for some early traditions.35 Even though 
these views on the development of the S tradition contain some irreconcil-
able diff erences, both Dimant and Hempel seem to wish to see continuities 
more clearly (Dimant within 1QS as well as over later 4QS manuscripts; 
Hempel on the shared material in all manuscripts), and both see a long 
development before any of the existing manuscripts were  created. Th e 
words of Hempel are indicative for our purpose: “It seems likely, therefore, 
that the terms rabbîm and ‘council of the community’ emerged in distinct 
literary—and probably also communal—settings and were eventually con-
fl ated in parts of the S tradition.”36 If this is the case, such distinct settings 
testify to complexity within the movement. It seems to me that the very 
existence of separate traditions, some of which were brought together at 
various stages, testifi es to the members’ perception, according to which the 
movement was a heterogeneous, complex environment, of a great deal of 
freedom and variety.37
Idem Identity between D and S traditions
Concerning the relationship between the S and D traditions, it is in some 
way or other assumed that communities lie behind the S and D traditions.38 
Th ere seems to be fundamentally something diff erent between D and S, 
but every attempt to conceptualize this diff erence can be opposed with 
several “buts.” Th e diffi  culty arises from the fact the lines between various 
35 Hempel, “Th e Literary Development,” 396.
36 Hempel, “Th e Literary Development,” 400. My emphasis.
37 Unless, of course, it can be shown that the earlier traditions were preserved 
only for the sake of replacement by a later tradition. Further work is necessary to 
see which ideas actually override each other. 
38 Th ere are also other voices, cautious of fi nding groups behind texts, e.g., 
Philip R. Davies, “Sects from Texts: On the Problems of Doing a Sociology of the 
Qumran Literature,” in New Directions in Qumran Studies, 69–82. Charlotte 
Hempel, Th e Laws of the Damascus Document: Sources, Tradition and Redaction 
(STDJ 29; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 36–37, rightly calls for caution in taking these 
rules as a direct window into the community life because of the strong scriptural 
orientation in many of them. In a similar way, Sarianna Metso, “Methodological 
Problems in Reconstructing History from Rule Texts Found at Qumran,” DSD 
11 (2004): 315–35 (332–33), points out that the Community Rule is not a pre-
scriptive law book in the community.
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phases of the movement or between diff erent groups cannot be drawn 
strictly between individual documents. A substantial amount of shared 
elements between the D and S traditions exists, and although not always 
identical, these elements testify to common literary traditions deemed 
 signifi cant by these groups: both describe a simple admission procedure 
with an oath (CD 15:5b–10a;39 1QS 5:7c–11a // 4QSb 9:6b–8b;40 4QSd 
1:5b– 7a); both demand separation from outsiders (e.g., CD 6:14b–15a; 
1QS 9:16 ii; 4QSd 8:1b; 4QSe 3:13b–14a); both refer to confession of sins 
(CD 20:27b–30a; 1QS 1:24–2:1); both claim to have true knowledge of 
the divine law (CD 3:12b–16a; 1QS 4:6; 5:9, 11); both mention groups 
of ten (CD 13:1b–2; 1QS 6:6b–8a // 4QSd 2:7b–8a); both structure their 
meetings hierarchically (CD 14:3–6; 1QS 6:8b–10a); both acknowledge 
the system of thousands, hundreds, fi fties and tens (CD 13:1–2; 1QS 
2:21–22); both refer to an annual renewal of the covenant and the cursing 
of the enemy (4QDa 11 17–18a // 4QDe 7 ii 11–12a; 1QS 2:4b–25a); 
both have an elaborate penal code (CD 14:20–22 // 4QDa 10 i 14–ii 15 // 
4QDb 9 vi // 4QDd 11 i 4–ii 5; 16 // 4QDe 7 i 1–21; 1QS 6:24–7:25 // 
4QSd 5 [frg. 2]; 4QSe 1:1–2:9; 4QSg 3–6); both have instructions for the 
maśkîl (CD 12:20b–21a // 4QDa 9 ii 7; 1QS 3:13; 9:12; 1QS 9:21 // 
4QSb 18:5 // 4QSd 8:5 // 4QSe 4:2; 4QSb 9:1 // 4QSd 1:1); both mention 
“sons of light” (4QDa 1:1; 1QS 3–4).41 Th e S tradition actually includes 
very little material that does not have a parallel of some sort in the D tradi-
tion. Th e most striking absences in D are the extensive discourse on the 
two spirits (1QS 3–4), the metaphors of the temple (1QS 5; 8), and the 
hymn at the end (1QS 9–10). Th e D tradition, in contrast, includes more 
material that is not found in the S tradition. However, it is the kind of 
material that seems to be presumed by the S tradition in many ways; most 
notably, the S members could not do without halakah, and probably also 
not without some understanding of the movement’s beginnings, which are 
found in D.
39 A parallel to the following section is found in 4QDa 8 i, but the passage on 
the oath has not been preserved there. 
40 Column numbers follow Philip S. Alexander and Geza Vermes, DJD 26. 
41 Th e editors of 4QS manuscripts in DJD mention parallels in the confession 
of sins (1QS 1:23–2:1 and CD 20:28–30), in the theology about the remnant 
(1QS 4:14 and CD 2:6–7), and numerous parallels in the penal code material, but 
admit that the list is only partial, Alexander and Vermes, DJD 26:3. 
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Th is is not to say that the direction of dependence and borrowing always 
goes from D to S; most probably it does not, and some of the above paral-
lels can be the work of redactors who wanted to make the documents look 
more similar.42 However, shared elements between D and S and within D 
and S are so many and show such an important amount of independence 
that we ought to refrain from dealing with them merely as the work of 
harmonizing scribes without any counterpart in social reality.
What one makes of these shared traditions is of course the crucial ques-
tion. It would be too simplistic to claim that the persisting core or the 
essence of the movement is found in the shared material of D and S. It 
might not be; some aspects that are represented in one document only 
might testify to continuing practices in the movement (most likely, halakic 
practices), and diff erences between the documents can testify to real 
 diff erences/changes in the movement (at the least, in the terminology 
used). But the answers given often fail to appreciate the full signifi cance of 
the shared material. In the following, one area is investigated that poten-
tially aff ected the D and S members’ perceptions, categorization of them-
selves and identifi cation over time. What the movement was considered to 
be is refl ected in the admission to the group.
Idem Identity upon Admission?
Th e procedure of taking an oath is shared by D and S traditions (CD 
15:5b–10a; 1QS 5:7c–11a // 4QSb 9:6b–8b; 4QSd 1:5b–7a),43 and these 
42 Th e language of light and darkness is otherwise absent from D traditions and 
could have been added to align it with the S tradition. I did not include any orga-
nizational terminology in the list above; e.g., rabbîm terminology is problematic 
from this perspective: it is found both in S and D, but not systematically in either. 
Hempel, Th e Laws, 83, argues that it is the work of the S redactors in D.
43 Th e 4QSb,d manuscripts contain a shorter version of the oath-taking. Most 
notably, they do not contain the reference to “Sons of Zadok” and “the multitude 
of the people of their covenant” as receivers of revelation but “the council of the 
people of the community.” Our interest is in the self-categories of members taking 
the oath, and these diff erences would not seem to play a great role, unless it can 
be shown that the authority structure was very diff erent between these traditions, 
which does not seem likely; cf. Sarianna Metso, “Qumran Community Structure 
and Terminology as Th eological Statement,” RevQ 20/79 (2002): 429–44.
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formulations reveal something of what was believed to distinguish mem-
bers from non-members: they turned to the Law of Moses with all their 
heart and soul and submitted to what is revealed of the Law.44 Th e oath 
captured both ideological and practical aspects of the shared social iden-
tity: it was about turning back to the ancient, divine Law but in a necessary 
and practical usage of it within the movement.
According to D, not all were qualifi ed to take the oath, however. Th e 
meb̆aqqēr examined the initiate before teaching the laws (CD 15:10 ff .). S 
does not refer to an examination in connection to oath-taking but does 
elsewhere (see below). Instead, the S tradition has separation from the 
“people of injustice” as a requirement for membership, which is again 
absent in this block of the D tradition. Th e need for separation, however, 
is found elsewhere in D, for CD 6:11b–7:9a includes a summary of com-
munity duties, often assigned to an early layer within the document.45
Who are the “people of injustice” according to S? Th e sudden change in 
number from plural to singular is confusing in 1QS 5:13b–15b: “He shall 
not enter the water to touch the purity of the people of holiness. . . . ” Hem-
pel is inclined to reject the suggestion that it would speak of members’ 
insincere conversion.46 Instead, she thinks that “we are still dealing with 
the rival group, the people of injustice, who are so close to the community, 
or at least some of its members, or have been close in the past, that what is 
said about them can read like a description of insincere members.” Th is is, 
in my view, correct, but another question is whether the people of injustice 
were a rival group (“a clearly recognizable social entity”)47 or outsiders in 
general from whom the members needed to distinguish themselves. Th e 
44 See further Jutta Jokiranta, “Social Identity in the Qumran Movement: Th e 
Case of the Penal Code,” in Explaining Christian Origins and Early Judaism: 
Contributions from Cognitive and Social Science (ed. Petri Luomanen, Ilkka 
Pyysiäinen, and Risto Uro; Biblical Interpretation Series 89; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 
277– 98. Th e term nigleh probably refers to scriptures available to all groups (see 
Lawrence H. Schiff man, Reclaiming the Dead Sea Scrolls: Th e History of Judaism, 
the Background of Christianity, the Lost Library of Qumran [Philadelphia: Th e 
Jewish Publication Society, 1994: 186–88) but, at the same time, it implies the 
idea of having knowledge of its exact meaning (parush, CD 6:14), requiring care-
ful study of the scriptures and search for their correct meaning.
45 Hempel, Damascus Texts, 44–49. 
46 Charlotte Hempel, “Th e Community and Its Rivals According to the Com-
munity Rule from Caves 1 and 4,” RevQ 21/81 (2003): 47–81 (53).
47 Hempel, “Community and Its Rivals,” 81.
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people of injustice do not necessarily have a social identity of their own. 
Part of the social categorization is to accentuate the diff erences between 
out- and in-groups, and to accentuate the similarities within the out-group. 
According to the shared social identity, in-group members were commit-
ted to the Law and its revelation, and outsiders were not.48 But the mem-
bers learned these things only gradually as they were taught the rules, and 
may not yet have grasped in full the diff erences to some of the outsiders. It 
was the duty of the maśkîl to “teach them to separate from every man who 
fails to keep himself from perversity” (1QS 9:20b–21a).
Th e more elaborate and possibly later admission procedures (1QS 
5:20b–25a; 6:13b–23;49 1QS 9:12–21; CD 12:11–13)50 provide informa-
tion about the shared social identity but in a diff erent way. In these 
 procedures, examination and the hierarchical structure of the group are 
emphasized: the candidate is tested about his/her understanding and 
deeds51 and is ascribed his/her position by the superiors accordingly.52 If 
48 Contacts with the outsiders were then strictly regulated, concerning work, 
property, knowledge, food and business dealings (1QS 5:13b–17). Th is was the 
consequence of adopting the social category.
49 Charlotte Hempel, “Community Structures in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Admis-
sion, Organization, Disciplinary Procedures,” in Th e Dead Sea Scrolls after Fifty 
Years: A Comprehensive Assessment. Vol. 2 (ed. Peter W. Flint and James C. 
VanderKam; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 67–92 (70), compares the section in S to the 
oath- taking in CD, and states: “Th e procedure laid down in 1QS 6:13b–23 
refl ects a degree of institutionalization.”
50 1QS 1:7b–11a also speaks about bringing in the volunteers but it is not clear 
if these are rules for the maśkîl (the title has not been preserved although is recon-
structed in 4QpapSc 1:1) or more generally describing the membership ideals.
51 CD 12:11–13 includes also skills, power and property that the m̆ebaqqēr 
investigates. 1QS 1:11b–13 talks about bringing in knowledge, skills and  property. 
Also CD 15:11 mentions testing but does not specify this. Concerning property, 
both D and S members subjected its use to the movement’s decisions and, there-
fore, the diff erence between handing over two days’ wages per month (D) or 
perhaps all one’s property (S) tells only part of the story.
52 However, the superiors vary from priests + non-priestly members (1QS 5), 
pāqîd + rabbîm/priests + non-priests (1QS 6), maśkîl (1QS 9), to m̆ebaqqēr (CD 
12). More important than the title of the individual(s) doing the examination is 
the variation between what seem to be one-step procedures and the three-step one 
in 1QS 6. If there was a development towards a more lengthy procedure (so 
 Hempel, “Community Structures,” 67–93) or if such a procedure was only 
 practiced in some groups but not others, there would be a potential diff erence in 
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these passages refl ect the actual procedures, a person who goes through 
such an admission understands him/herself to be qualifi ed: outsiders are 
those who did not qualify or do not even seek to be qualifi ed. Further-
more, such a person knows his/her place in the hierarchical order of the 
group, even in the cosmic order, if the discourse on two spirits is to be 
believed.53 Th e person submits to superiors but can also have subordinates, 
at least in the course of time. Th e shared social identity is not only about 
what distinguishes oneself from outsiders, but how, once the candidate is 
an insider, that diff erence translates to one’s “true self ” at a given moment 
and to relations to other insiders.
A collective admission procedure is depicted in 1QSa 1:2–5: “When 
they come, they shall assemble all those who come, including children and 
women, and they shall read into their ea[rs] all the regulations of the 
 covenant, and shall instruct them in all its precepts, so that they do not 
stray in their [errors].” Th is is followed by rules for various age groups. In 
this admission, the emphasis is on instruction and education. Th e person 
who joins the group is part of a structured teaching and legal system, meant 
to keep him/her from erring, or to return him/her to the right track after 
erring. Outsiders are without such a system of guidance.
Lastly, we can take a look at the collective renewal of the covenant (1QS 
1:16–2:12: // 4QSb 2:1–13; 3:1–4; CD 14:3–6a; 4QDa 11 17–18a // 
4QDe 7 ii 11–12a), which presumably was an annual procedure. Liturgies 
are eff ective means of promoting a shared understanding of group mem-
bership.54 According to S, this liturgy included praise of God’s deeds, con-
fession of sins, blessings on the lot of God and curses on the lot of Belial. 
Th e dividing line between the insiders and outsiders went, according to 
this line of thought, not between those who sin and those who do not, but 
rather between those who confess their sins and those who do not or who 
social identities; at least, the sense of qualifi cation of the candidate would be much 
stronger with those participating in the lengthy procedure. 
53 In light of the discourse on the two spirits, the ranking was fundamentally 
God’s work: he created every person with a share of spirit of light and spirit of 
darkness (1QS 4:26; 9:12–14). Rather than a crucial diff erence in comparison to 
D (cf. Davies, “Th e Judaism(s) of the Damascus Document,” 38), this discourse 
seems to me to off er the members yet a further, most abstract identity category, 
according to which they were expected to view the world and the universe. 
54 See, e.g., Russell C. D. Arnold, Th e Social Role of Liturgy in the Religion of the 
Qumran Community (STDJ 60; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 59–80.
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accept a “hardened heart” once in the covenant.55 Th e hierarchical order is 
again stressed.
Does a coherent shared social identity emerge from these passages? In 
my view, yes, to a certain extent: a member adopted a social identity 
according to which the voluntary act of joining was necessary in order to 
align oneself with the covenantal laws. Th e emphases vary, partly refl ecting 
the further implications of this identity when the member proceeded to 
cultivate a new identity. Examination and qualifi cation played a role upon 
admission.56 Th e contents and manner of the testing probably varied from 
one period to another, if not between the sections of the movement. It has 
been suggested that a physiognomic investigation of a person’s spirit had a 
part in the decision-making of admitting or excluding a person.57 Th e 
physiognomic and astrological knowledge was, however, restricted to a 
small number of intellectuals, possibly the community leaders,58 so it is not 
very likely that the outward appearance of the members as such would 
have been seen as distinguishing them from outsiders. In general, the stan-
dards of membership were apparently diff erent for those joining and for 
those already accepted and instructed in the community; more was 
demanded from senior members (1QS 7:22–25) and they had more power. 
A member who experienced the cursing of the outsiders for the fi rst time 
came to realize what his/her new membership meant.
55 Th e D fragments include a similar idea about one who rejects these laws 
and is being cursed but they do not include the confession of sins (4QDa 11 5b–
16 // 4QDe 7 i 19b–21).
56 In light of 1QS 5:7–13, it is possible that, at some stage or in some groups, 
there was no examination at all. However, see below.
57 Most recently, this is cautiously suggested by Mladen Popović, Reading the 
Human Body: Physiognomics and Astrology in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Hellenistic-
Early Roman Period Judaism (STDJ 67; Leiden: Brill, 2007), esp. 230–39. Horo-
scope texts (4Q186; 4Q561) testify to the belief in the close connection between 
one’s outward appearance and one’s characteristics and fate determined by the 
date of birth and the position of stars. According to Popović, investigating the 
“spirit” does not refer to evaluating the human spirit but the person’s zodiacal sign 
and the related zodiacal spirit which could be potentially harmful (172–208). Th e 
movement possibly wanted to exclude persons that could more likely pose a threat 
to the whole group. Popović also suggest that physiognomic inquiry could have 
been used as diagnostic tool “to determine the kind of treatment and cure for the 
community members attacked by zodiacal spirits of a less harmful nature” (239). 
58 Popović, Reading the Human Body, 215–32. 4QZodiacal Physiognomy was 
also written in a cryptic manner.
 J. Jokiranta / Dead Sea Discoveries 16 (2009) 309–329 327
A further question is which role the admission passages are given in the 
overall understanding of the identity construction in the movement.
Th e debate on the small groups of 1QS 6:1b–7a is relevant in this regard. 
Th e “groups of ten” form a part of the shared traditions of D and S, but 
were such groups a continuing reality in S,59 or rather historical memories 
from the past,60 or rules for restricted, specifi c purposes?61 If 1QS 6 is con-
sidered to refl ect the historical primitive setting where “likeminded Jews” 
 gathered together to eat, pray and exchange counsel, as Hempel thinks,62 
there would be no identity based on the specifi c act of changing one’s life 
and on qualifi cation and examination—or would there? Th e very idea of 
setting up a “voluntary association” includes selection, breeding and culti-
vation of the members. Either these individuals already had a very elite 
understanding of themselves and of how things were run, or the oath-tak-
ing or some kind of admission was presumed in this passage. I think the 
59 John J. Collins (“Th e Yaḥad and ‘the Qumran Community’,” in Biblical 
Traditions in Transmission: Essays in Honour of Michael A. Knibb [ed. Charlotte 
Hempel and Judith M. Lieu; JSJSup 111; Leiden: Brill, 2006], 81–96 (86)) argues 
that 1QS 6:1b–7a refers to small groups (yaḥad being an umbrella term for them) 
whereas the following section, 1QS 6:8b–13a, speaks of “an assembly rather than 
a community” and could refer to something like “the assembly of all the camps” 
in D (CD 14: 3). See also Torleif Elgvin, “Th e Yaḥad Is More than Qumran,” in 
Enoch and Qumran Origins: New Light on a Forgotten Connection (ed. Gabriele 
Boccaccini; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005), 273–79.
60 Hempel, “Interpretative Authority,” 61–68, argues that the section 1QS 
6:1c–8a is composed of three literary layers, which were brought together because 
of common themes and catchwords. In her view, the earliest layer in 1QS 6:1c–3a 
“gives the impression of going back to the earliest and simplest beginnings of 
communal life, if it can be called that, where small numbers of individuals congre-
gated to eat, pray, and take counsel together.” Also Charlotte Hempel, “Emerging 
Communal Life and Ideology in the S Tradition,” in García Martínez and 
Popović, eds., 43–61 (45) writes: “I see no reason to presuppose that the highly 
developed communal structure described elsewhere in S co-existed with the prim-
itive scenario outlined here.”
61 Metso, Th e Textual Development, 135. She (“Whom Does the Term Yaḥad 
Identify?” in García Martínez and Popović, eds., 74–84 [75–76]) considers the 
possibility that 1QS 6:1–8 was preserved in S for the occasions when members of 
the yaḥad  travelled and lodged in small Essene settlements in towns and villages. 
However, Metso acknowledges problems with this interpretation, and eventually 
considers this passage as a “time-honored set of directives,” deriving from earlier 
settings (77). 
62 Hempel, “Emerging Communal Life,” 45.
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latter is more likely: the passage is otherwise concerned with similar mat-
ters as many other rules for assemblies: hierarchical order, ratio of priests, 
giving and taking counsel. If some qualifi cation played a role, the setting is 
perhaps not that primitive; they had a clear program. Or alternatively, we 
could think that the essential activities of the S members were considered 
to be this simple. S can have more to do with assemblies than with com-
munities.63 Rules convey to us a lot of information about these groups, but 
most of all, they convey the movement as it wishes itself to be preserved in 
the eyes of new members and in the teaching of the senior members.64 
Both D and S members relied on the counsel of their superior members, 
such as the maśkîl and the meb̆aqqēr, in their everyday life, and perhaps 
saw that counsel being given primarily in small group assemblies.65
Conclusion
It is a matter of what the movement is considered to be as to how much 
variation is allowed in it for it to be considered the same over time. Th is 
analysis concerning the hypothetical members of D and S was very focused, 
yet this thought-experiment runs the risk of harmonizing the sources. Th e 
63 Th is is in contrast to the argument by Sarianna Metso, “Whom Does the 
Term Yaḥad Identify?” in Biblical Traditions in Transmission: Essays in Honour of 
Michael A. Knibb (ed. Charlotte Hempel and Judith M. Lieu; JSJSup 111; Leiden: 
Brill, 2006), 213–35 (219), that 1QS 6:8b–13a is a later interpolation, and “the 
organizational terminology in sections regulating community life in 1QS V–
VII—if VI, 1c–8a is removed—seems to be envisioning a relatively consistent 
community structure and hierarchy and a sizeable community.” Th e size of the 
movement the candidate joined is also not irrelevant in terms of social identity.
64 Th e ser̆ākîm may not have so much to do with confl ict with out-groups, or 
distinguishing from the out-groups, but with the question of how to harness the 
personal identity into the service of the social identity, how to safeguard the pur-
pose of the community, and how to deal with the contesting identities within the 
groups (e.g., tasks of the maśkîl).
65 On a sociological level, Cecilia Wassen and myself have attempted to show 
that despite the diff erences between D and S, a common sectarian stance can 
be perceived behind both documents. See Cecilia Wassen and Jutta Jokiranta, 
“Groups in Tension: Sectarianism in the Damascus Document and the Commu-
nity Rule,” in Sectarianism in Early Judaism: Sociological Advances (ed. David J. 
Chalcraft; London: Equinox, 2007), 205–45.
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analysis already suggests, however, that in their perception of admission, 
group activities and language, foundations for common in-group identity 
and continuity of that identity are perhaps much stronger than previously 
thought. Th e movement was concerned with a total commitment to the 
Torah within the framework of the counsel of the members.
What the movement was thought to be can better be conceived of on 
the basis of its activities rather than on its social set-up. Th e idem identity 
was not defi ned in relation to distinct forms of communities (even if these 
existed). Th e sameness of such a movement could, for example, be defi ned 
by principles visible in the annual assembly: if boundaries surrounding 
whom to accept and whom to exclude, or the authoritative principles 
would be dramatically changed, the movement could be seen as another 
movement. Titles, terminology, number of participants, process of admis-
sion or rules of behavior for assemblies were more likely to be considered 
as subject to changes—the movement could be perceived as the same 
movement. Of course, changes in the environment and diff erences between 
groups might also give rise to schisms or segregation. Th eoretically, any 
diff erence between D and S could have been adopted as a crucial identity 
marker and used in the construction of a new identity. However, the 
admission procedure did not show evidence of this. Any study of the rela-
tionship between D and S should examine the fl exible and hierarchical 
nature of social identities and take these perspectives into account in the 
movement’s reconstruction.
Th e movement naturally had a fl ow of people in and out. Diff erent 
community terminology and emphases can, to a large extent, be explained 
as attempts to fi nd the most suitable tools for promoting group cohesion 
and necessary theological views for a particular setting. Group cohesion is 
not only challenged from the outside. Th e social identity approach shows 
how the group needs to defend its social identity over time: contesting 
claims naturally arise within a group. Achieving an agreement on the fun-
damental contents of the in-group identity is an ongoing process. Scholar-
ship benefi ts from non-Qumran centered thinking, even if one supports 
the existence of a “community at Qumran.” A movement that remains, at 
least for the greater part, among outsiders, and which functions both on a 
small scale as well as has larger gatherings, is able to include a rich array of 
variation in it and also preserve its sameness.
